A National DNA Database? No thanks

The conviction of Steve Wright for the murders of five prostitutes in Ipswich following the use of DNA material collected from an earlier arrest for another crime poses a number of interesting questions. First, how reliable is DNA evidence itself? The answer seems now to be that DNA techniques are well refined and do not admit of error. We have, after the use of DNA matching, heard little more of the protestations about the innocence of James Hanratty, executed for the A6 murder. The only sufferer in relation to the apparent infallibility of DNA matching must be the writers of detective stories whose mysteries can now be pierced by the needles of forensic science.

Secondly, how fair is it that people who are arrested and finger-printed now have their DNA taken as well, and these records remain in police hands if the individual is acquitted at trial, or even if proceedings are actually discontinued? This seems to stigmatise not the guilty, of whom it might easily be said that they are likely to commit other crimes, but also those who may have been innocent all along but who have attracted police attention.

Thirdly, should everyone be required to submit a sample of DNA to a national database? The government has declared that there are practical and ethical reasons for not implementing this. Pressing the point further, one commentator said that perhaps we should all be micro-chipped in order to allow for gps tracking of every one of us. It might have an effect on the reduction of crime and no-one (except criminals) is likely to think this is a bad thing. Naturally there are worries about the use to which the government might put the information (perhaps creating a bank of persons whose genetic make-up displays a predisposition to commit crimes). It’s a bit science fiction frightening, like that excellent movie, Minority Report. No one would feel that the government’s record on data security is reassuring. We have almost weekly revelations about the loss of data from computers in cars, discs sent through the post, missing data in the USA and the like. Not an attractive proposition at all.

But leaving that practicality aside, why should I deny the government access to knowing my DNA code. It seems a monstrous intrusion into our private lives for the police to have the unfettered right to take samples of our DNA because it clearly contains sensitive and intimate information. If, however, the police were investigating a murder or serious assault near me, would I refuse to supply DNA in accordance with their wish to eliminate me as a suspect. There may be a privilege against self-incrimination but it’s hard to see why I should decline to co-operate with a police enquiry unless I have either committed a crime or am thinking of doing so in the future. There may a presumption of innocence in a criminal court but the police must take the opposite view. For them we are all guilty unless we can prove otherwise.

Fourthly, it does seem that the current database of some 4.5 million persons is unfair as it includes all those who have been arrested, whether convicted or not. Should the criteria be changed? This is being challenged in the courts now as it is extremely difficult to have one’s DNA record removed from the database once it is placed there. The inclusion of all those convicted of serious crimes may be a sensible precaution in that we know the prison system is so ineffective or the individuals sent there so recalcitrant that enormous number re-offend. To include those who are otherwise ‘innocent’ seems illogical and unfair. Apparently about 5% of the UK population are on the database whilst in the USA the figure is 0.5%. But then the Americans are much more sceptical about the abuse of authority then we are.

A national DNA database would have uses other than the detection of crime. It might help to identify the victims of multiple person disasters, or the unidentifiable drunk who has collapsed by the side of the road. However rational it seems, the idea of compulsorily acquiring a specimen of DNA from every one of us seems to be a bridge too far. There is no doubt, nonetheless, that some debate will rage over this issue when the technique has proved so successful in rooting out killers. No one will regret that.

Richard 

 

4 Responses

  1. [...] Ramsay, one of the Editors of Consilio has written a short commentary on the DNA database [...]

  2. Thank you Richard – a fine article that covers all the primary issues concerning the DNA database. May I ask about an unconnected but equally poignant issue please? Having read Boris (my hair is even madder than Heseltine’s was) Johnson’s comments on the UK/USA Extradition Treaty in ‘Taking Liberties’ I am working through the 2003 Extradition Act and the March 2003 Treaty trying to find where the issue of presentation of evidence may or may not be. Am I struggling in vain to find something that isn’t there or just missing something glaringly obvious? Any advice would be very gratefullty received before I develop a terminal lurgi of the eyes.

  3. Sorry not to have seen this before. A comment on one of my blogs — I’m still staggering.

    A quick look at the explanatory notes to the 2003 Act —

    Section 206: Burden and standard of proof
    585. This section provides that, where a question arises concerning the burden or
    standard of proof during extradition proceedings under this Act, it must be decided
    through the application of existing law in criminal procedures (subsections (1) and
    (2)). Where this situation arises, the law is to be applied as if the person were accused
    of a criminal offence and the requesting territory were the prosecution (subsection
    (3)).
    586. However, subsection (4) provides that this rule is subject to any express
    provisions of this Act. (See, for example, section 7(3).)

    Is this what you were after?

    I’m not sure exactly what your question meant otherwise.

    The section itself says (I think it’s hard to understand!) –

    206 Burden and standard of proof
    (1) This section applies if, in proceedings under this Act, a question arises as to
    burden or standard of proof.
    (2) The question must be decided by applying any enactment or rule of law that
    would apply if the proceedings were proceedings for an offence.
    (3) Any enactment or rule of law applied under subsection (2) to proceedings
    under this Act must be applied as if—
    (a) the person whose extradition is sought (or who has been extradited)
    were accused of an offence;
    (b) the category 1 or category 2 territory concerned were the prosecution.
    (4) Subsections (2) and (3) are subject to any express provision of this Act.
    (5) In this section “enactment” includes an enactment comprised in, or in an
    instrument made under, an Act of the Scottish Parliament.

    Hope I’ve saved your eyes a bit,

    Richard

  4. One extradition case has folded. See The Lawyer today, from which I quote this:

    House of Lords throws out Norris extradition case
    12-Mar-2008

    Katy Dowell

    White & Case has won a landmark House of Lords victory that will undermine key points of the UK’s extradition treaty with the US.
    Handing down a unanimous judgment, five Law Lords ruled against the extradition of Ian Norris, the former chief executive of FTSE 250 company Morgan Crucible, to face charges relating to a price fixing cartel.
    The US government attempted to extradite Norris on charges of fixing the price of carbon products between 1989 and 2000. Norris denied the charges.
    Lord Bingham of Cornhill, Lord Rodger of Earlsferry, Lord Carswell, Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood and Lord Neuberger of Abbotsbury quashed part of the Home Secretary’s order that a British businessman could be extradited to the US on a charge of price-fixing.
    The decision will have implications for dozens of pre-2003 price fixing extradition cases between the UK and US. The Enterprise Act 2003 outlawed price fixing in the UK but the UK extradition treaty with the US specifically states that for a British citizen to be extradited under price-fixing charges, the practice must have been illegal in both countries at the time when it is alleged to have occurred.
    Norris’ counsel White & Case partner Alistair Graham, who instructed Brick Court chambers’ Richard Gordon QC, Jonathan Sumption QC and Martin Chamberlain, successfully argued that the businessman had not acted unlawfully because the act did not come into force until 2003.
    Today (12 March) the Law Lords struck out the price fixing charges against Norris, ruling that English common law has never recognised such conduct as illegal.

The Law Lords also ruled that to extradite Norris to the US would be in contravention of his retrospective punishment rights under Article 7 of the European Convention on Human Rights.
    David Perry QC, Louis Mably QC and Adina Ezekiel of 6 King’s Bench Walk acted for the US Government, while Khawar Qureshi QC of Serle Court represented the Home Office.

    Richard

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